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Stimulating Local Public Employment: 
Do General Grants Work?
* 
 
The effectiveness of public funds in increasing public employment has long been a question 
on public and labor economists’ minds. In most federal countries local governments employ 
large fractions of the working population, meaning that a tool for stimulating local public 
employment can substantially affect the overall unemployment level. This paper asks 
whether general grants to lower-level governments have the potential of doing so. Applying 
the regression kink design to the Swedish grant system, we are able to estimate causal 
effects of intergovernmental grants on personnel in different local government sectors. Our 
robust conclusion is that personnel in the central administration increased substantially after 
a marginal increase in grants, but that such an effect was lacking both for total personnel and 
personnel in child care, schools, elderly care, social welfare and in technical services. We 
suggest several potential reasons for these results, such as heterogeneous treatment effects 
and bureaucratic influence in the local decision-making process. 
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1 Introduction 
The potential for public funds to stimulate public employment in times of worldwide 
economic recession is now a most salient policy issue. The public sector constitutes an 
important source of employment in many countries; it often employs around 15–20 percent of 
a country’s labor force, and stimulating employment in this sector may be a promising way to 
reduce the overall unemployment level. From a federalist point of view, intergovernmental 
grants are the most important financial means through which the central government can 
impact lower-level governments. We can expect, therefore, that many federalist countries will 
apply this type of tool to try to limit the negative consequences on public welfare that today’s 
recession is likely to have.
1 One country where the central government has turned its hope to 
public employment is Sweden; in the fall of 2009 the Swedish government decided to give a 
significant amount of extra general grants to local governments. The purpose of these 
additional grants, they argued, is to avoid layoffs in order to guarantee a sustained welfare 
level and limit overall unemployment effects. But will these grants work? Are general grants 
effective in stimulating local public employment?
2  
 
In this paper, we estimate causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on municipal 
personnel in Sweden for the period 1996–2004, both in total and disaggregated by sector. In 
doing this, we add to the literature examining the effects of public funds on public 
employment – a literature that is surprisingly sparse, given its policy relevance.
3 For the 
specific role of grants in explaining local public employment, we know of only one study; 
Bergström et al. (2004). Using the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator, they find that 
intergovernmental grants have a negligible effect on total local public employment in 
Sweden.
4 This paper differs from theirs in three important ways. First, we have more detailed 
panel data on the number of employees in different local government sectors, data which 
enables us to study not only local public employment in total, but also disaggregated by 
sector. Second, we give more consideration to likely endogeneity problems and have a more 
convincing identification strategy. Third, we use data from a period (1996-2004) in which the 
local governments did not face any constraints on their self-governance. One problem with 
the period under study (1988-1995) in Bergström et al. (2004) was that it covered several 
                                                 
1 This idea is, of course, not new. For example, in the 1970’s the U.S. introduced the Public Employment Program (PEP) and 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) with this purpose in mind. 
2 We know from previous research on Swedish data (see Dahlberg et al., 2008) that increased grants stimulate spending one-
for-one, but we don’t know for what the grants are used. 
3 The literature on private employment is considerably larger. However, drawing inference from this literature to the public 
sector is very likely misleading, since public employment differs from private employment in many important ways. For 
example, governments do not, in contrast to private firms, operate under the objective of profit maximization, but rather, their 
goal is (ideally) to maximize the welfare of their citizens. 
4 Dahlberg and Mörk (2006) study the determinants of Swedish municipal labor separately for bureaucrats, child care, elderly 
care and schools. Like Bergström et al. (2004) they, too, do not find that grants have any sizeable effects on the level of 
employment. However, because their main focus is on estimating wage elasticities in the different sectors, they simply treat 
grants as a control variable. It is therefore likely that their estimate of the grants effect is biased.   3
years (1991-1995) in which the central government effectively froze the local income tax at 
the 1990 level.  
 
Estimating causal effects of grants on personnel employed by the municipality is not 
straightforward since it is likely that grants are endogenous. The root of the endogeneity 
problem is that grants are not randomly distributed to municipalities, but, rather, that 
municipalities receive grants motivated by some underlying need. Such needs are likely to be 
directly related to labor demand, implying that perceived correlations between grants and 
employment partly stem from the determinants of the grant distribution rather than the causal 
effect of grants in itself.
5 In this paper, in order to solve this endogeneity problem we will 
adopt a version of the identification strategy used by Dahlberg et al. (2008). The idea is to 
make use of a kinked assignment rule in the Swedish grant system whereby municipalities 
with a net out-migration above two percent receive grants, whereas those below two percent 
do not. Because any direct effect of out-migration on personnel can be assumed to be smooth, 
a kinked relationship between out-migration and personnel can be attributed to differences in 
the amount of grants received. 
 
Our method is similar in spirit to the regression discontinuity design (RDD) (see, e.g., Angrist 
and Lavy, 1999; Hahn et al., 2001; Lee, 2008), and is labeled Regression Kink Design (RKD) 
by Nielsen et al. (2010). Card et al. (2009) derive formal identifying assumptions and 
resulting testable predictions for this method.
6 In this paper we adopt a fuzzy version of the 
RKD, where the identifying assumption of no kink in the direct effect of out-migration on the 
outcome (i.e., of smooth direct effects) is used as an exclusion restriction in an IV-estimation. 
 
Earlier studies on the demand for public sector labor can, along the lines of Ehrenberg and 
Schwarz (1986), be divided into two strands – one that focuses on estimating wage elasticities 
and one that focuses on the effectiveness of public funds in increasing public employment and 
thereby decreasing overall unemployment. See Ehrenberg (1973) and Dahlberg and Mörk 
(2006) for contributions on estimating wage elasticities, Johnson and Tomola (1977) for an 
evaluation of early public employment programs, and the above-mentioned study by 
Bergström et al. (2004) for an investigation of effects of intergovernmental grants on public 
employment. The present paper investigates whether grants can stimulate public employment 
and thereby fits into the second strand. 
 
Sweden has one of the largest public sectors in the world and local governments play a 
significant role in sustaining the welfare state through the delivery of child care, education 
                                                 
5 See also Besley and Case (2000) for a discussion of endogenous policies in general, and Knight (2002), Gordon (2004) and 
Dahlberg et al. (2008) for further discussions of potential endogeneity of grants. 
6 Both Nielsen et al. (2010) and Card et al. (2010) have empirical applications on the RKD, as do Guryan (2003), and 
Simonsen et al. (2010).   4
and care for the elderly. Of the approximately 25 percent of the labor force working in the 
public sector, the vast majority are employed by a municipality, and wages and payroll taxes 
make up close to 50 percent of municipal expenditures. Thus, Sweden is well suited for 
studying issues concerning public employment. At the same time, since the public sector is 
important in many other countries as well, these issues are of general concern. 
 
Our results show that an increase in intergovernmental grants has no effect on the total 
number employed by the municipality. This result is in line with the findings in Bergström et 
al. (2004). When looking at employment disaggregated by sector we only find a positive, 
statistically significant effect on administrative personnel, whereas the personnel in other 
sectors (child care, schools, elderly care, social welfare and technical services) are unaffected 
(in a statistical as well as economical sense). Furthermore, the estimated impact on 
administrative personnel is rather large, with a one standard deviation increase in grants 
causing administration to increase by 0.85 standard deviations – an economically significant 
effect. Focusing on wages on the other hand, we find that these are increased in most sectors, 
as is total spending. 
 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the strategy used to 
identify causal effects of intergovernmental grants on different types of local government 
personnel. Section 3 provides a description of the role of local governments and 
intergovernmental grants in Sweden, along with a description of the data. Section 4 gives the 
baseline results, as well as a detailed examination of the validity of the identifying 
assumptions. Section 5 presents further findings on effects of grants on other outcome 
variables, and section 6 concludes by discussing possible interpretations of the results. 
2 Identification  strategy 
We are interested in the causal effect of intergovernmental grants on different types of 
municipal personnel, i.e., the relationship we want to identify is given by 
 
(1)  ,0 1 ,, it it it yg α αε =+ +,      
 
where  , it y  is the number of personnel employed by municipality i in year t (total and 
disaggregated by sector), and  , it g  are grants received by the municipality. A (naïve) OLS-
estimate of  1 α  will most likely be biased. The bias can be due to, e.g., simultaneity of grants 
and personnel – i.e., that there is some mechanism through which the level of public 
employment affects the grant distribution. As explained in the introduction, a second possible   5
source of the bias is omission of key variables that determine both the grant distribution and 
local labor demand. Note, however, that even in cases where the grant formula is completely 
known, it may be impossible to identify the causal effect of grants simply by including all the 
determinants in the regression, because by doing so there is no remaining identifying variation 
in the grants variable of interest. Irrespectively of the source of the bias, to eliminate it, ideally 
we would like to conduct an experiment where municipalities are randomly given different 
amounts of grants and then study their behavior. Because such an experiment will most likely 
never be conducted (it seems quite politically infeasible), we turn to institutional details that 
allow us to come as close as possible to randomization of grants. Following Dahlberg et al. 
(2008), we will use a kinked assignment rule in the Swedish cost-equalizing grants as a source 
of exogenous variation. The cost-equalizing grants come with no strings attached and are 
intended to support municipalities that are characterized by demographic and other structural 
conditions associated with higher costs. We will return to the role played by these grants in 
section 3. 
 
The cost-equalizing component we focus on supports jurisdictions with a diminishing 
population by distributing out-migration grants,  ,
m
it g , to municipality i in year t according to 
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where the assignment variable  , it m  is the percentage decrease in the size of the population  , it n  
during a ten-year period with a two-year lag, i.e.,  ( ) ,, 2 , 1 2 100 1 / it it it mn n −− =− . Although the 
assignment variable may partly reflect changes in mortality rate and birthrate, we will refer to 
it as (net) out-migration rate. 
 
The assignment mechanism in (2) prescribes that municipalities with out-migration rates 
below two percent do not receive any out-migration grants, whereas those with out-migration 
rates above two percent do, implying a kink-point at two percent. For those above the kink-
point, the increase in per capita grants due to a percentage point increase in out-migration is 
represented by the parameter b, which was constant and equal to 100 SEK during our period 
under study. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the assignment mechanism in (2) by plotting out-migration grants received 
by the municipalities, both the total amount and the marginal increase, against the assignment 
variable. As can be seen from panel (a), there is a well-defined kink-point where   6
municipalities with net out-migration rates lower than two percent do not receive any grants, 
whereas municipalities with net out-migration rates above two percent do receive grants.
7 
Panel (b) of the figure also shows that the marginal increase in grants for each percentage 
increase in out-migration is 100 SEK per capita. Thus, as these graphs clearly show, there is a 
non-linear relationship between grants and out-migration, and a discontinuous relationship 
between grant increases and out-migration. 
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Card et al. (2009) derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a kinked assignment rule, 
such as that in (2), to identify a local average treatment effect (LATE) on some outcome. For 
our application, it is required that, first, the derivative of the density of the net out-migration 
rate is smooth – i.e., that the distribution is twice continuously differentiable – at two percent 
and, second, that the marginal effect of out-migration on personnel is smooth.
8 The first 
assumption rules out extreme sorting, or precise manipulation of the assignment variable, 
which for our application seems innocuous. The second assumption says that, although we 
allow for the assignment variable to have a direct effect on the outcome, there can be no kink 
in this relationship. Or in other words, there can be no jump in the marginal effect of the 
assignment variable on the outcome (like the one in panel (b) of Figure 1). The implication is 
that there should not be any kinks in pre-determined covariates, an implication that can be 
used to test the assumption. 
 
In this paper we adopt a fuzzy version of the RKD. Analogously to in the RDD, the fuzzy 
version of RKD is appropriate when treatment is not entirely determined by distance to the 
kink-point. For our case, although the assignment rule in (2) is entirely deterministic 
regarding treatment of out-migration grants, treatment of cost-equalizing grants is not 
deterministic due to kink-points in other components of the cost equalization that – by 
                                                 
7 The total cost for this grant component is divided equally (per capita) between all municipalities, implying that it is neutral 
in terms of the federal budget. 
8 Note that these assumptions are somewhat stronger than in the regression discontinuity framework, where one only needs to 
assume smoothness in the level (and not in the marginal effect).   7
coincidence – are close to the kink-point we have in mind.
9 This setting implies that one could 
potentially formulate a model that would estimate a separate treatment effect for each kink. 
Such an approach is however not viable for two reasons: First, the structure of the other 
components containing kinks are typically very complicated and do therefore not allow for 
summarizing an RKD treatment effect in a single parameter. Second, such a model would 
require the inclusion of flexible functions of all the different assignment variables, and on 
some of these we lack data. 
 
Our focus will instead solely be on the component for out-migration grants and the 
assignment rule in (2), which we will use in an IV-estimation of the effect of an increase in 
cost-equalizing grants,  , it g . As in the sharp RKD, the identifying assumption (i.e., the 
exclusion restriction) is still that of no kink in the direct effect of out-migration on the 
outcome. We additionally need to assume that any direct effects of other variables subject to 
kinked assignment rules are also captured by the inclusion of the control function in out-
migration. 
 
The first and the second stage in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) are given by the 
following two equations: 
 
(3)  () () ,0 1 , , , , 1 for
p p
it it p it t it it p g mk D mk T mk h γγ φ η
= =+ − + − + + − ≤ ∑  
 
(4)  () ,0 1 , , , , 1 ˆ for ,
p p
it it p it t it it p yg m k Tm k h αα δ ε
= =+ + − + + − ≤ ∑  
 
where  , ˆit g  are predicted cost-equalizing grants obtained from estimation of the first stage, 
2 k =  is the kink-point, the term interacted with  , 1 it Dm k ⎡ ⎤ = > ⎣ ⎦ , which is an indicator for 
out-migration rates above the kink-point, is the excluded instrument and  t T  are time fixed 
effects. Thus, the excluded instrument captures the kinked relationship between out-migration 
and personnel stemming from increased out-migration grants.
10 The direct effect of out-
migration is represented by the term summing over order of polynomial p, with  p  being the 
highest order of polynomial included in the regression, and h is the bandwidth that determines 
which observations are included (i.e., [,] kh kh − + ). We will present results with different 
combinations of  { } 1, 2,3 p =  and  { } 5,10,15, h = ∞ . 
                                                 
9 For a description of the cost equalization during the period under study, see Svenska Kommunförbundet (2003). 
10 Note that if the assignment rule in (2) were entirely deterministic regarding treatment of cost-equalizing grants, the 
parameter  1 γ  in equation (3) would be identical to the parameter b in (2), and there would be no need for a two-stage 
procedure.   8
The resulting estimate of  1 α  is a weighted LATE-estimate, with weights proportional to the 
ex-ante probability of being close to the kink-point. Due to the non-linearity in the grant 
formula we are thus able to mimic an experimental setting quite closely. In terms of Figure 1, 
after controlling for the smooth direct effects of out-migration on personnel, municipalities on 
opposite sides of the kink are similar in all respects except that some are eligible for the grant 
and others are not. A kink in the relation between out-migration and personnel can therefore 
be attributed to differences in the amount of grants received. 
 
It is worth noting that as our suggested procedure estimates a direct causal effect, omitted 
variable bias is no longer a concern, and for identification purposes there is no need to control 
for additional covariates or municipality fixed effects.
11 As seen from equations (3) and (4), 
we will, however, include year fixed effects to control for aggregate shocks that affect all 
jurisdictions in the same way (e.g., inflation). 
 
In order for the estimated coefficient to represent a causal effect, the instrument needs to be 
relevant, the exclusion restriction of no kink in the direct effect needs to hold and the control 
function of out-migration needs to capture the direct effects of any other variables subject to 
kinked assignment rules. The relevance of the excluded instrument can simply be examined 
by looking at the t-statistic and its associated p-value for the estimated parameter of this term 
in the first-stage estimation. As noted above, an implication of smooth direct effects is that 
there should not be any kinks in pre-determined covariates, and consequently, this assumption 
can be tested by estimating the model on such covariates and see whether there is a “treatment 
effect”. This, as well as other tests of the different identifying assumptions, will be further 
discussed in section 4.4. 
3 Institutional  background 
This section provides a description of local governments in Sweden and the role played by 
intergovernmental grants, along with a description of the data used in the paper. 
3.1 Fiscal  federalism  in  Sweden 
Decentralized governments in Sweden are among the largest in the world, with a 
comprehensive range of responsibilities, including primary and secondary education, child 
care and care for the elderly. The production of these services is very labor-intensive and 
roughly 20 percent of the entire work force is employed by the municipalities, making them 
the largest employer in the country. As a consequence, costs for personnel constitute around 
                                                 
11 We will return to the role of additional covariates when testing the validity of the identifying assumption. See section 4.4 
for more details.   9
half of all municipal expenditures. The most important source of municipal revenue is a 
proportional local income tax, which makes up 60–70 percent of total revenues. The rest is 
made up of user fees and grants. Because equalization is a major feature of the grant system, 
the importance of grants as a source of revenue varies substantially across jurisdictions. The 
average share is just above 15 percent, but there are also three municipalities in the Stockholm 
region that actually were net contributors to the grant system during the entire 1996–2004 
period. 
 
A major grant reform in 1993 replaced a system of targeted central government grants to all 
municipal services (education, child and elderly care, social services and infrastructure) with 
general grants, i.e., the majority of grants were no longer earmarked. After some early 
changes, the new system that came into place in 1996 consisted of a per capita grant, income-
equalizing grants and cost-equalizing grants, all distributed as general grants with no strings 
attached. The cost equalization aimed at reducing differences in effective costs due to variable 
structural conditions across municipalities, whereas the purpose of the income equalization 
was to bring per capita tax revenues close to the national average.
12 It is worth noting that the 
same grant system prevailed during the entire period studied here. 
3.2 Data 
This paper uses a panel of 279 Swedish municipalities observed over the time period 1996–
2004.
13 As mentioned in section 2, the grant formula that is used for identification is an 
element of the cost-equalizing grants designed to compensate local governments for 
additional costs due to sizeable out-migration. During 1996–2004, the average out-migration 
grant as a fraction of total cost-equalizing grants for eligible municipalities amounted to 
around 18 percent, whereas the cost-equalizing grants for eligible municipalities amounted to 
around 20 percent of total grants. As described previously, jurisdictions with net out-
migration below two percent were not eligible for out-migration grants, whereas those above 
two percent were. Over the study period, 112 municipalities never received any out-migration 
grants, 55 municipalities received grants all nine years and the remaining 112 municipalities 
received grants some, but not all, years. As can be seen from the map in Figure 2, receiving 
municipalities can be found all over the country, even though they are concentrated in the 





                                                 
12 Both of the equalizing grants were self-financed by equal per capita contributions from all municipalities. 
13 The dataset covers all municipalities except for eight that were affected by consolidations (Bollebygd, Borås, Lekeberg, 
Örebro, Nykvarn, Södertälje, Knivsta and Uppsala) and three that have responsibilities that the other municipalities do not 
have (Gotland, Malmö and Göteborg).   10




Table 1 displays summary statistics for the two grant variables (cost-equalizing grants and 
migration grants, both measured in SEK per capita), the dependent variables (total personnel 
and personnel in central administration, child care, schools, elderly care, social welfare and 
technical services,
14 all measured in full-time equivalents per 1,000 capita) and the 
assignment variable (net out-migration rate).
15 The large standard deviations relative to the 
means and the negative minimum values of cost-equalizing and out-migration grants reflect 
the fact that the grant system is self-financed. As for personnel, most people are employed in 
elderly care and schools – 21 and 17 full-time equivalents per 1,000 inhabitants, respectively 
– followed by personnel in child care and in technical services, with around 10 full-time 
equivalents per 1,000 inhabitants. An aggregated version of these numbers is illustrated in 
Figure 3, which shows the sector-wise evolution of the total number of people, in full-time 
equivalents, employed by the municipalities in the country. We see that employment in 
elderly care has increased quite substantially (due to the aging population), as has 
employment in schools, whereas fewer are employed in child care.
16 Employment in the 
remaining sectors has been fairly stable, and, all in all, the number of full-time equivalents 
                                                 
14 The way in which total personnel is disaggregated into the various sectors is in accordance with the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities and Regions. 
15 It is worth noting that the net out-migration rate that determines whether or not a municipality is eligible is taken from 
register data. Hence, there is no room for the municipality to manipulate the figures in order to become eligible for the grants. 
16 Part of the employment decrease in child care and increase in schools is explained by a transfer of pre-schools for 6-year 
olds from the child care sector to the school sector.   11
increased from around 460,000 in 1996 to 475,000 in 2004. This slight increase runs parallel 
with a positive privatization and outsourcing trend taking shape during the 1990s. For 
example, of everyone working in the child care sector, the share employed by a municipality 
was 94 percent in 1995 and 90 percent in 1999 (Statistics Sweden, 2001). Although the public 
share of employment has experienced similar decreases in other sectors as well, as of 2004 the 
vast majority working in areas traditionally dominated by public providers were still 
employed by a municipality. 
 
Table 1 also presents the socio-economic variables that will be used to test the identifying 
assumption of smooth direct effects of out-migration (see section 4.4): population size, share 
of population aged 0–6, share of population aged 7–15, share of population aged 80 years or 
older and share of foreign-born citizens. These variables show large variations across 
municipalities, as does the amount of migration (which of course is the underlying reason why 
there is a need for equalization). 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Variable Mean  Std  dev  Min  Max 
Personnel, total  65.03  9.88  30.89  101.8 
Personnel, central administration  5.48  1.13  2.19  12.86 
Personnel, child care  10.55  1.72  3.33  17.90 
Personnel, schools  16.71  2.71  8.45  32.09 
Personnel, elderly care  21.20  6.66  1.48  41.11 
Personnel, social welfare  1.78  0.706  0.084  6.82 
Personnel,  technical  9.31 2.42 1.63 17.79 
Cost-equalizing grants  532.1  2,452  -3,471  13,196 
Migration grants  111.7  286.8  -125.5  1,384 
Net out-migration  -0.789  7.92  -42.95  16.64 
Population 27,229  48,884  2,575  761,721 
Share of population 0–6  7.92  1.31  4.71  12.80 
Share of population 7–15  12.23  1.19  6.78  16.43 
Share of population 80+  5.41  1.38  1.25  9.14 
Share  foreign  born  4.01 2.73 0.56 29.06 
# of observations  2,511 
Notes: Grants are defined in SEK per capita, personnel are defined as number of full-time equivalents per 1,000 
inhabitants, and net out-migration and population shares are given in percent. Data is obtained from Statistics 
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4  Effects of grants on local government personnel 
In this section we present two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the model given in 
equations (3) and (4) to examine what effects increased grants have on different types of 
personnel. In order to test whether the instrument is relevant (i.e., whether the kinked rule 
assigning out-migration grants explains variation in cost-equalizing grants), we present the 
results from the first stage. Thereafter, we turn to the estimates of the causal effects from the 
second stage. We will also conduct a thorough analysis of the identifying assumptions. But 
before turning to the econometrics we begin with a graphical analysis. 
4.1 Graphical  analysis 
As in the RDD, visual inspections are important parts of RKD applications because of the 
nature of the estimator – if there is an effect, we expect to see a kink in the outcome 
corresponding to the kink in the assignment rule. For an as fair picture of this relation as 
possible, it is customary to plot means of the outcome within a specified bin width of the 
assignment variable, along with fitted polynomials on each side of the kink-point. Focusing 
on out-migration rates +/-10 from the kink-point, Figure 4 does this for total personnel and for 
personnel within each of the different categories, where we have chosen a quadratic fit and a 
bin size of one percentage point.
17 For administrative personnel there is a distinct kink around 
                                                 
17 Lee and Lemiuex (forthcoming) suggest two formal tests for choosing bin size in graphical regression discontinuity 
analyses, and with a slight modification these tests can also be applied to the RKD. The first test is an F-test of a model with 
C separate slope coefficients (intercepts for RDD) against a model with 2C separate slope coefficients. If the test is not 
rejected, C bins are enough. The second test is an F-test of a model with C separate slope coefficients (intercepts for RDD) 
against a model with C separate slopes and C separate coefficients on quadratic terms (linear for RDD). Again, if the test is 
not rejected, C bins are enough. Performing these tests for all of our outcome variables, 20 bins (implying a bin size of one) 
are never rejected at the 10 percent level.   13
two percent out-migration, suggesting a positive treatment effect on this personnel category. 
However, neither for total personnel nor for any of the other personnel categories are any such 
kinks present (although out-migration appears to have a quite strong direct effect, albeit with a 
large variance for school and social welfare personnel). The econometric analysis to follow 
will show how these graphical results correspond to statistical estimates. 
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4.2 First-stage  estimates 
As the graphical analysis in the previous section suggest, it is important to allow the 
assignment variable to have a direct effect on personnel. We do this by including a flexible 
function of this variable in the regression. One might worry that when doing this, there will be 
no explanatory power left in the instrument, which would thereby fail to be relevant. Whether 
or not this is the case will be clear from the first-stage estimates − more precisely, from the p-
values of the estimate of the incremental effect of out-migration on total cost-equalizing 
grant,  , it g , at the kink-point. This estimate corresponds to  1 γ  in the first-stage regression 
given in equation (3). If  1 γ  is statistically significant, we know that after controlling for the 
direct effects of the smooth function of net out-migration, the out-migration grant still has an 
impact on total cost-equalizing grant, implying that our instrument is relevant. 
 
Because we do not know the form of the direct effects of the assignment variable, we wish to 
be as flexible as possible. Therefore, we use up to a 3
rd order polynomial in net out-migration. 
Table 2 shows the first-stage estimates and associated standard errors of  1 γ  in equation (3). 
The standard errors are robust to arbitrary residual heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
within municipality.
18 Each row corresponds to an estimation of equation (3) with 
{ } 1, 2,3 p = , while each column corresponds to an estimation where either all observations are 
included, or where the estimation sample is restricted to observations +/- 15, 10 and 5 
percentage points from the kink-point. Note that with the two narrowest bandwidths we only 





                                                 
18 Rigidities in hiring and firing suggest that there is a time-lag in employment, which is also shown to be the case in 
Bergström et al. (2004). This time-lag emphasizes the importance of adjusting the standard errors accordingly – something 
we do by using the “cluster” command in STATA.   15
Table 2 First-stage estimates (c.f. eq. (3); only estimates for  1 γ  reported). 
 Full  sample  h=15  h=10  h=5 
Cost-equalizing grants      


















# of observations  2,511  2,346  2,047  1,241 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and order of polynomials,  p , the table reports estimates of γ1 in the first-
stage equation (3) on cost-equalizing grants. Standard errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses, and 
*** and ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
 
From the table it is clear that all estimates are highly statistically significant, irrespectively of 
order of polynomial and bandwidth. The magnitude of the estimates is around 300, although 
that differs somewhat across the different specifications. Note that owing to other kinks in the 
cost equalization close to the kink in the out-migration component, the parameter is estimated 
to differ from 100, which would be the case if treatment of cost-equalizing grants were a fully 
deterministic function of the assignment rule in (2). As explained above, this is the rationale 
for adopting a fuzzy version of the RKD, and poses no identification problem as long as any 
direct effects of assignment variables subject to other kinks are captured by the included 
control function. The validity of this claim will be investigated in section 4.4, but for now we 
conclude that the instrument works well in the sense that it is relevant, and turn to the two-
stage least square estimates of the causal effect of grants on municipal personnel. 
4.3 Two-stage  least  squares  estimates 
Table 3 presents the 2SLS estimates of  1 α  from equation (4) for total personnel, as well as for 
personnel disaggregated by the six sectors (administration, child care, schools, elderly care, 
social welfare and technical services). Again, for each outcome the three rows correspond to 
estimation with  { } 1, 2,3 p = , while each column corresponds to estimation with different 
bandwidths. For bandwidths where we vary the order of polynomial, the order preferred 
according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is in bold. All results are evaluated at 
personnel per 1,000 capita for the dependent variable and 100 SEK per capita for the grants 
variable (i.e., the increase in grants associated with a one percentage point increase in net out-
migration from two percent). 
 
To start with the results for total personnel, it is clear from the first three rows of Table 3 that 
there is, in fact, no overall effect of grants.
19 Not only are the estimated coefficients 
statistically insignificant, but in some specifications the sign is even negative. In fact, the 
                                                 
19 This result is well in line with the results in Bergström et al. (2004).   16
disaggregated effects on the various sectors in subsequent rows show that insignificant, 
negative estimates seem to be a rather consistent pattern. The only positive, statistically 
significant effect is that on administrative personnel, for which the estimates are around 0.03-
0.04. This point estimate is fairly robust to different bandwidths and order of polynomials, 
although for the smallest bandwidth the standard error increases to the extent that the estimate 
is no longer statistically significant. For the other personnel categories on which we find no 
statistically significant effects, the estimates are somewhat more sensitive to the different 
specifications, although much less so if one only focuses on the specifications preferred 
according to the AIC. 
 
Concerning the size of the effect on the administration, we consider it to be of economic 
significance as well – a 100 SEK increase in per capita grants leads to an increase of 0.03-
0.04 full-time equivalents per 1,000 capita, which is around 0.5 percent of the mean for this 
personnel category. Given that the mean of the absolute value of the cost-equalizing grant is 
around 1,500, implying that 100 SEK constitute a 6-7 percent increase, this is a substantial 
effect.
20  
4.4  Inspection of the identifying assumptions 
Our baseline result is thus that grant increases cause the administrative personnel to increase 
substantially, but that such an effect is lacking both for total personnel and personnel in child 
care, schools, elderly care, social welfare and technical services. The validity of these results 
rests on the identifying assumptions, and in this section we test each of them starting with the 
assumption of smooth density of out-migration. We then investigate the assumption that the 
control function captures any direct effects of other variables subject to kinked assignment 
rules, followed by a test of the assumption of smooth direct effects of out-migration by 
studying pre-determined covariates. The section ends by utilizing an additional non-linear 
grant component, which yields two instruments and thus a more efficient estimator (and the 









                                                 
20 Because of the equalizing feature of the grants, more than half of the observations on cost-equalizing grants are negative. 
Such negative values imply that evaluating the size of a grant increase in the context of the mean value from Table 1 would 
be misleading. 
   17
 
Table 3 Effects of grants on municipal personnel (2SLS estimates). 
  Full  sample  h=15 h=10 h=5 
Total personnel      
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#  of  observations  2,511 2,346 2,047 1,241 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and order of polynomials,  p , the table reports estimates of α1 in the second-
stage equation (4), with dependent variables total personnel as well as personnel disaggregated by the different 
sectors. Standard errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
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4.4.1  Smooth density of the assignment variable 
As shown by Card et al. (2009), one of the identifying assumptions in the RKD is that the 
derivative of the density of the assignment variable is smooth around the kink-point. This 
implies that extreme sorting needs to be ruled out, something which is best done graphically 
as in Figure 5. This figure plots the number of observations within each 1-percentage point 
bin of net-outmigration in the range (-8, 12). Although the density of observations does not 
evolve smoothly within the entire range, it is comforting to see that nothing dramatically 
happens around the kink-point at two percent (marked by the vertical line).
21 Given the type 
of assignment variable in our application this comes perhaps has no surprise: it seems quite 
difficult for municipalities to perfectly manipulate their rate of out-migration during a ten-
year period. Also, Figure 5 shows that there are a large number of municipalities around the 
kink-point, indicating that the weighted LATE-estimate that we estimate in fact applies to 
quite many municipalities. 
 










































4.4.2  Omitted kinked assignment variables 
As explained in section 2, due to kinked relations in other components of the cost 
equalization, treatment of cost-equalizing grants is not an entirely deterministic function of 
the kinked rule assigning out-migration grants. This is the reason why we adopt the fuzzy 
version of the RKD. As a consequence, we need the additional assumption that any direct 
effects of other variables subject to kinked assignment rules are captured by the control 
function in net out-migration. This section provides evidence that this assumption is likely to 
hold. 
 
                                                 
21 The econometric complement to the graphical validation of this identifying assumption is to run the regression in equation 
(3), with the number of observations within each bin of a specified size as the dependent variable, and test whether 
1 γ  differs 
from zero. Doing this we do not reject the null for any  2 p ≥ .   19
Our approach to investigating the validity of this assumption is to control for those additional 
components that appear particularly problematic, and see both how the first and the second 
stage results are affected. After a detailed study of all the 15 remaining components in the cost 
equalization (not counting the out-migration component), we concluded that the components 
for child care, social welfare and settlement structure are those that – for what appears to be a 
coincidence – contain non-linearities close to the kink-point at two percent out-migration.
22 If 
our assumption that the effect of the variables underlying these components are well captured 
by the control function in out-migration holds, then controlling for grants received from these 
components should not affect the second stage-estimates much, although it may – and in fact 
should – affect the first-stage results. 
 
Looking first at Table 4, which presents the estimate of  1 γ  from estimating equation (3) while 
controlling for grants received from the child care, social welfare and settlement structure 
components, we see results in line with our predictions. Compared to the baseline first-stage 
estimates in Table 2, these are much closer to 100.
23 The corresponding second-stage 
estimates are found in Table 5. To economize space we only present the estimate with the 
order of polynomial preferred by the AIC.
24 Interestingly given the change in first-stage 
estimates from the previous table, these results are quite similar to those from the baseline 
specification in Table 3 – the point estimates for administration, in particular, are extremely 
robust, and those for total personnel and for the remaining personnel categories are, overall, 
again close to zero. An exception to this stability is however displayed by school personnel, 
for which the negative effect increases quite substantially and turns statistically significant. 
While this seems odd and indeed quite worrisome, later results will show that there is a 
potential explanation for this finding. Thus, the combination of such a stark reduction in the 
first-stage estimate and the fact that the vast majority of the second-stage estimates remain 
mainly unchanged is evidence that the assumption concerning direct effects of other 







                                                 
22 In a fairly complicated manner, these components assign grants to municipalities based on municipal characteristics such 
as share of children, labor market situation, share of foreign citizens, number of single mothers, population density and 
remotely located population. 
23 Recall that 
1 γ  would be 100 if the kinked assignment rule in (2) fully captured the variation in cost-equalizing grants.  
24 All remaining tables presenting second-stage estimates will, to save space, from now on contain only the estimate preferred 
by the AIC (among those using the full sample or h=15). Among the 14 such regressions in Table 5,  1 p =  is preferred in 
nine,  2 p =  in two and  3 p =  in three. Full sets of results are available upon request.   20
 
Table 4 First-stage estimates when controlling for other types of grants. 
 Full  sample  h=15  h=10  h=5 
Cost-equalizing grants      


















# of observations  2,511  2,346  2,047  1,241 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and order of polynomials,  p , the table reports estimates of γ1 in the first-
stage equation (3) on cost-equalizing grants when controlling for grants received from the following parts of the 
cost equalization: child care, individual and family care and settlement structure. Standard errors clustered on 
municipality are in parentheses, and *** and ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 Effects of grants on municipal personnel when controlling for other types of grants 
(2SLS estimates). 
 Full  sample  h=15  h=10  h=5 








      








      








      








      








      








      








      
# of observations  2,511  2,346  2,047  1,241 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and order of polynomials,  p , the table reports estimates of α1 in the second-
stage equation (4), with dependent variables total personnel as well as personnel disaggregated by the different 
sectors, when controlling for grants received from the following parts of the cost equalization: child care, social 
welfare and settlement structure. Standard errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses, and ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The preferred polynomial according to the AIC 
is in bold. 
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4.4.3 Pre-determined  covariates 
Aside from the assumption of smooth derivatives of the density in the assignment variable 
that we tested in section 4.4.1, the second main identifying assumption derived by Card et al. 
(2009) is that the marginal effect of the assignment variable on the outcome is smooth. In 
terms of our application, we thus require that there is no kink in the marginal effect of out-
migration on personnel. The implication of this assumption is that there should not be any 
kink in pre-determined covariates: if the direct effects of out-migration on personnel are 
smooth, the effect on pre-determined covariates should also be smooth. This means that a 
straightforward test of this assumption is to run the model on such covariates and test whether 
there is a “treatment effect”. 
 
A prerequisite for this test to work is that the chosen variables are pre-determined – i.e., they 
can not be the result of the treatment. In a local government setting this may be easier said 
than done, since, to some extent, most things are interdependent both across time and space. 
Motivated by such concerns, our choice of covariates used to test the identifying assumption 
are the following: total population, share of population aged 0–6, share of population aged 7–
15, share of population aged 80+ and share of foreign-born citizens. With these variables as 
outcomes, we thus re-estimate the model in (3) and (4) with different combinations of  p  and 
h, and the resulting  1 α  estimates are provided in Table 6.
25 
 
A few more estimates are statistically significant than what we would require to be fully 
convinced, at least for population shares aged 7-15. This is, on the other hand, not hard 
evidence against smooth marginal effects of out-migration. And as will be clear from next 
section, the statistical significance of the share of school-aged children may explain the 
change in the estimated effect on school personnel as found in Table 5. Also, since none of 
the other pre-determined covariates show any consistent signs of kinks, overall these results 
are not enough to shed any serious doubts on the validity of the identifying assumption, and 








                                                 
25 Again, Table 6 only shows the estimate from the regression with the order of polynomial preferred by the AIC.  1 p =  is 
preferred in seven of the regressions, and  3 p =  in three (of the ten using the full sample or h=15). 
26 An alternative way of testing whether the effect on pre-determined covariates is smooth around the kink-point is to rerun 
the original model on personnel while controlling for them, and see if the baseline estimates change. When doing this we 
found that the original results are insensitive to the inclusion of the pre-determined covariates in Table 6, strengthening the 
validity of the identifying assumption of smooth marginal effects of out-migration. Results are available upon request.   22
Table 6 Effects of grants on pre-determined covariates (2SLS estimates). 100 SEK 
 Full  sample  h=15  h=10  h=5 








      








      








      








      








      
# of observations  2,511  2,346  2,047  1,241 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and for the order of polynomial,  p , preferred by the AIC, the table reports 
estimates of α1 in the second-stage equation (4), with dependent variables total population and population shares 
aged 0-6, aged 7-15, aged 80+ and foreign born. Standard errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses, 
and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The preferred polynomial 
according to the AIC is in bold. 
 
4.4.4  Using an additional policy rule as instrument 
In the year 2000, a second distinct, non-linear component was added to the out-migration 
component of the cost equalization, whereby municipalities were also compensated for having 
to adjust to fewer school-aged children. This compensation was conditioned on the net out-
migration rate during the past three years (with a two-year lag), which had to be larger than 
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where the additional assignment variable  , it s  is the percentage decrease in the number of 
school-aged children  ,
s
it n  during a three-year period with a two-year lag, i.e., 
( ) ,, 2 , 5 100 1 /
ss
it it it sn n −− =− , and the conditioning variable  , it m   is the out-migration rate during 
the same period, i.e.  ( ) ,, 2 , 5 100 1 / it it it mn n −− =−  . The parameter 
s b  represents the size of the 
per capita grant increase due to a percentage point increase in  , it s  (given  , 2 it m >  ), which was   23
100 SEK during 2000–01 and 55 SEK during 2002–04.
27 That is, for the shorter time period 
2000–04, we have two non-linear grant rules;
28 the rule in equation (2) and the rule in 
equation (7). 
 
Assuming that the direct effect on personnel of diminishing numbers of school-aged children 
is smooth, we thus have a second exclusion restriction for this latter period. As a third 
approach to investigate the exogeneity of the instrument, we make use of both the kinked 
assignment rules and re-estimate our model with two instruments − a more efficient estimator, 
but for a shorter time period.
29 Thereafter, we can also conduct the Hansen J test of 
instrument validity/correct model specification.
30 
 
For the period 2000–04, the first stage is now given by 
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s k =  is the second kink-point and  ,, 11 2
ss
it it Ds k m ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = >× > ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦   is an indicator for 
decreases in the number of school-aged children (above the kink),
31 given a three-year out-
migration rate above two percent. 
 
The second-stage counterpart to equation (8) is then given by 
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27 During 2000–01, this compensation was based on changes in the age group 7–15, and in 2002–04 on changes in the age 
group 7–18. The mean of the school grants variable is 9.7 SEK per capita, and its standard deviation is 60.3 (the minimum 
value is -10.2 and the maximum value is 752.1). The mean of the net change in the number of school-aged children is 2.65 
percent, and the standard deviation is 4.08 (the minimum value is -10.25 and the maximum value is 23.59). 
28 As previous sections have made clear, the cost equalization in fact contains several non-linear rules. But importantly, for 
the shorter time period 2000-04 we have two kinked grant rules that are not too complicated for being summarized in a single 
RKD treatment parameter. 
29 As noted in the introduction, the identification strategy in this paper is a version of the one in Dahlberg et al. (2008). 
Besides the more thorough specification checks performed throughout this paper, a difference is that they did not separate the 
two non-linearities into two instruments and were thus not able to test any overidentifying restrictions. 
30 It is worth noting that the Hansen J statistic really tests whether several distinct instruments result in the same estimate. To 
rely on the Hansen J as a test for instrument exogeneity, one therefore has to assume i) that one of the instruments is 
exogenous and ii) homogenous treatment effects. Hence, to fully rely on the Hansen test when evaluating instrument-validity 
is not recommended. 
31 The indicator 
s D  is adjusted according to the change in the parameter 
s b  from 100 to 55 in year 2002 so as to give a 
proper interpretation of the 
2 γ  parameter.   24
As previously, we will estimate equations (8) and (9) with different combinations of 
{ } 1, 2,3 p =  and  { } 5,10,15, h =∞ . Note, though, that we choose the same bandwidth and 
maximum polynomial for the two respective assignment variables. 
 
Before turning to the results, we want to know whether the same municipalities that already 
received out-migration grants also received this extra grant. Looking at this in our data, we 
find that in the year 2000, i.e., the first year that this additional grant existed, there were 167 
municipalities that did not receive any of these two grants, 83 municipalities that received the 
out-migration grant but not the school grant, 6 municipalities that received the school grant 
but not the out-migration grant, and 23 municipalities that received both these grants. There is 
hence some overlapping, but far from all municipalities that were granted according to the 
rule in equation (2) were also granted according to the rule in equation (7). 
 
Table 7 gives the first-stage estimates. It is clear from the table that both instruments are 
relevant – for  2 p ≤ , both  1 γ  and  2 γ  are significantly different from zero at the five percent 
level. For  3 p = , however, only the original kink-point is significant and the F-statistic for the 
joint test of the excluded instruments is consequently weaker. Keeping this in mind when 
turning to the second-stage estimates in Table 8,
32 we start by noting that according to the p-
value of the Hansen J-statistic, we do not reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments (a 
correct model specification) for the vast majority of specifications. Hence, this third test also 
indicates that our approach is valid.  
 
An interesting and comforting finding is that for this shorter time period and with two non-
linear grant rules as excluded instruments, we get results very similar to those in the original 
specification (both with respect to the size of the estimates and significance levels). More 
importantly, the odd significantly negative effect on school personnel as found in Table 5 is 
now completely absent. Because of the obvious close relation between school personnel and 
the assignment variable in the additional kinked rule (changes in the number of school-aged 
children), this absence is particularly comforting. These findings thus strengthen our 
conclusion that marginal increases in grants increase the number of administrative personnel, 





                                                 
32 Among the 14 regressions in this table using the full sample or h=15,  1 p =  is preferred in nine,  2 p =  in four and  3 p =  
in one.   25
Table 7 First-stage estimates with two kinks.  
 Full  sample  h=15  h=10  h=5 
Cost-equalizing grants      
















1 p = , F-statistic  [23.78]*** [15.47]*** [17.25]*** [5.71]*** 
      










2 p = , F-statistic  [11.25]*** [6.28]***     
      










3 p = , F-statistic  [5.86]*** [4.57]***    
# of observations  1,395  1,319  1,100  456 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and order of polynomials,  p , the table reports estimates of γ1 and γ2 in the 
first-stage equation (8) on cost-equalizing grants. Standard errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses, F-
statistics of the excluded instruments are in brackets, and *** and ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent 
level, respectively. 
 
Table 8 Effects of grants with two kinks (2SLS estimates). 
 Full  sample  h=15  h=10  h=5 
Total personnel 0.039 
(0.048)  [0.487] 
0.068 
(0.100)  [0.638] 
0.009 
(0.055)  [0.200] 
0.002 
(0.141)  [0.804] 
      
Administrative personnel 0.028*** 
(0.005)  [0.343] 
0.031*** 
(0.006)  [0.485] 
0.036*** 
(0.007)  [0.882] 
0.023 
(0.019)  [0.437] 
      
Child care personnel -0.017 
(0.012)  [0.244] 
-0.006 
(0.008)  [0.079] 
0.000 
(0.010)  [0.301] 
0.014 
(0.033)  [0.810] 
      
School personnel -0.009 
(0.014)  [0.148] 
-0.023 
(0.019)  [0.038] 
-0.020 
(0.019)  [0.100] 
-0.046 
(0.056)  [0.563] 
      
Elderly care personnel 0.030 
(0.027)  [0.470] 
0.011 
(0.060)  [0.656] 
-0.014 
(0.034)  [0.488] 
0.013 
(0.076)  [0.693] 
      
Social welfare personnel -0.006* 
(0.003)  [0.037] 
0.001 
(0.004)  [0.194] 
0.004 
(0.006)  [0.283] 
0.003 
(0.013)  [0.028] 
      
Technical personnel 0.019 
(0.033)  [0.630] 
0.024 
(0.030)  [0.459] 
0.003 
(0.016)  [0.777] 
-0.004 
(0.046)  [0.554] 
      
# of observations  2,511  2,346  2,047  1,241 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and for the order of polynomial,  p , preferred by the AIC, the table reports 
estimates of α1 in the second-stage equation (9), with dependent variables total personnel as well as personnel 
disaggregated by the different sectors. Standard errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses, p-values of   26
the Hansen J statistic are in bracket, and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. The preferred polynomial according to the AIC is in bold. 
To sum up the results from the fairly thorough check of instrument validity provided in this 
section, we are quite confident that our identifying assumptions hold and, hence, in the 
baseline results presented in section 4.3.  
5 Further  analysis 
Thus, our robust conclusion is that administrative personnel are increased after a marginal 
increase in grants, but that such an effect is lacking both for total personnel and personnel in 
any of the other five sectors. How should we understand this result? Does it mean that all 
money from an increase in grants goes to the administrative sector? And if so, what type of 
administrative personnel do municipalities employ? 
 
In this section we will first examine whether municipalities employ administrative assistants 
or higher officials. Second, we will investigate possible other uses of money from the central 
government. There are at least two other possible ways of spending that will not show up in 
the estimates above: i) increase wages for those already employed, and ii) use the money for 
non-personnel related expenditures. In order to better understand how to interpret the 
asymmetric results on the administration versus other personnel categories, this section we 
will therefore investigate the effects of grants on wages for locally employed and total 
expenditures of different categories.
33  
5.1  Do municipalities employ administrative assistants or higher officials? 
The pool of bureaucratic personnel in the central administration, as we have defined it so far, 
is fairly broad – it includes everyone from frontline employees performing basic 
administrative assistant services to high officials and heads of local public authorities. Using 
access to detailed register data on all individuals employed by the municipalities, we are able 
to refine our analysis by studying different types of bureaucrats separately, which may help us 
understand the mechanism behind our results. 
 
Once again equation (4) is estimated with different bandwidths, with dependent variables now 
being administrative assistant personnel and high administrative officials, respectively. The 
resulting  1 α  estimates are shown in Table 9 (again, only for the order of polynomial preferred 
by the AIC).
34 These results clearly show that increases in employment take place among the 
administrative assistants, for which the estimated effect is around 0.015, meaning that a per 
                                                 
33 To provide a sense of the wage level in the different sectors and of the relative importance of the different expenditure 
categories, descriptive data is found in the Appendix. 
34Of the four regressions in Table 9 using the full sample or h=15,  1 p =  is preferred in three, and  3 p =  in one.   27
capita grant increase of 100 SEK leads to an employment increase of around 0.015 full-time 
equivalents per 1,000 capita. This increase corresponds to an addition of 1.5 percent to this 
personnel category. The effect on high administrative officials, however, appears to be very 
similar to the other sectors analyzed above, i.e., not significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 9 Effects of grants on different types of bureaucrats (2SLS estimates). 
 Full  sample  h=15  h=10  h=5 








      








# of observations  2,511  2,346  2,047  1,241 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and for the order of polynomial,  p , preferred by the AIC, the table reports 
estimates of α1 in the second-stage equation (4), with dependent variables administrative assistant personnel 
(containing 35 missing values) and high administrative officials. Standard errors clustered on municipality are in 
parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
5.2 Effects  on  wages 
Costs for personnel, which make up around half of municipal expenditures, are given by two 
components: the number of people employed and the wages paid to these employees. We 
know the effect of grants on one of these from section 4 above. What about the effect on 
wages?  
 
In our data we observe the total number of full-time equivalent employees as well as the total 
sum paid out as wages. Using these two variables we have calculated average monthly wages 
for employees in the local public sector, both in total and disaggregated by sector. Table 10 
shows the 2SLS estimates of the effects of grants on this measure of monthly wages (for 
different bandwidths and the order of polynomial preferred according to the AIC)
35. As above, 
the results are evaluated at a grant increase of 100 SEK per capita. From the table it is clear 
that increased grants are also used to raise wages in the public sector; only for school 
personnel is the point estimate statistically insignificant across all specifications. Because the 
economic significance is difficult to assess from these figures (due to the very different unit of 
measurement), we evaluate these effects in terms of standard deviations and then find that a 
one standard deviation increase in per capita grants leads to a 0.2–0.3 standard deviation 
increase in monthly average wages in the majority of sectors – i.e., a quite substantial wage 
effect. 
                                                 
35 Of all the regressions estimating the wage effect either on the full sample or with h=15,  3 p =  is preferred in two and 
1 p =  in the rest.   28
 
 
Table 10 Effects of grants on wages for municipal employees (2SLS estimates). 
 Full  sample  h=15  h=10  h=5 








      








      








      








      








      








      








# of observations  2,511  2,346  2,047  1,241 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and for the order of polynomial,  p , preferred by the AIC, the table reports 
estimates of α1 in the second-stage equation (4), with dependent variables wages in the local governmental sector 
overall as well as disaggregated by the different sectors. Standard errors clustered on municipality are in 
parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
5.3 Effects  on  expenditures 
Labor is not the only input in the production of local government services. Even though costs 
for labor make up around half of municipal expenditures, the other half may be as important. 
This half consists of costs for, e.g., premises and material such as books, computers, 
maintenance of infrastructure, etc. One reason why we do not find any employment effects in 
any other sector besides administration may be that those sectors are in greater need of other 
things than more personnel. Also, some municipalities have partly outsourced services such as 
education and elderly care, in which case the personnel is not publicly employed. 
 
According to the evidence in Dahlberg et al. (2008), increased grants stimulate total 
expenditures krona for krona. In order to understand whether non-personnel expenditures are 
affected by grants, we estimate our original model in equations (3) and (4), but on various 
expenditure categories rather than personnel categories. Results from these estimations are 
given in Table 11.
36 
                                                 
36 As in the previous tables, Table 11 only reports the estimate preferred according the AIC. Of all the expenditure 
regressions on the full sample or with h=15,  2 p =  is preferred by one,  3 p =  is preferred by one and  1 p =  by the rest.   29
 
Although the categorization into different types of personnel is not exactly analogous to the 
expenditure categories, it is clear from the estimation results that expenditures actually 
increase in most of the sectors when general grants increase, at least to some degree.
37 Noting 
that some of the estimates are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth but focusing on the 
statistically significant point estimates, we see that out of 100 additional krona in grants 
around 5 percent is spent on cultural and political activities, 10 is spent on child care, social 




Table 11 Effects of grants on different categories of expenditure (2SLS estimates). 
  Full  sample  h=15 h=10 h=5 








      








      








      








      








      








      








      








# of observations  2,502  2,337  2,039  1,234 
Notes: For different bandwidths, h, and for the order of polynomial,  p , preferred by the AIC, the table reports 
estimates of α1 in the second-stage equation (4), with dependent variables per capita expenditures in the 
respective sectors. Standard errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no separate category for administrative expenditures, but instead these 
costs are part of the different categories in Table 11. Along the same lines, an increase in 
monthly average wages may indicate two things; first, wages for those already employed may 
have been increased, and second, the composition of the pool of employees may have 
                                                 
37 Recalling the negative and significant effect on school personnel as found in Table 5, it is worth stressing that school 
expenditures are in no way exceptional to the pattern of expenditure effects displayed in Table 11. 
38 Due to rounding errors and quite large standard errors these effects do not exactly sum to 100.   30
changed as a result of the municipality laying off low-wage personnel and employing high-
wage personnel. With the data available to us, we cannot distinguish between these two 
possibilities. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
The effectiveness of public funds in stimulating public employment has long been a question 
on public and labor economists’ minds and remains, in these times of worldwide economic 
recession, as interesting as ever. In many federalist countries where local governments are 
major employers, increased intergovernmental grants have the potential of limiting overall 
unemployment. In this paper, by applying the regression kink design to the Swedish grant 
system, we are able to estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on personnel in 
different local government sectors. We examine the validity of the identifying assumptions in 
a variety of ways and verify that the exclusion restriction of there being no kink in the direct 
relation between out-migration and grants indeed seems to hold. Therefore, we can be quite 
confident that the estimated results represent causal effects and not only correlations. Our 
robust conclusion is that employment of bureaucratic personnel in the central administration 
is increased after a marginal increase in grants but that such an effect is lacking both for total 
personnel and personnel in any of the other five sectors (child care, schools, elderly care, 
social welfare and technical services). Furthermore, when we estimate the effects on 
administrative personnel separately for those with basic administrative assistance duties and 
high officials, we find that the effect comes from the former group. 
 
Our results raise interesting questions regarding the particular characteristics of central 
administration. In line with the hypothesis and results in Dahlberg and Mörk (2006), one 
possible explanation could be that bureaucrats are able to influence the local decision-making 
process in ways that other types of personnel cannot. Such bureaucratic power has long been 
recognized by economists.
39 But why would bureaucrats wish to employ more fellow 
bureaucrats, and specifically, more administrative assistant personnel? We can think of a 
couple of reasons for this. First, a large staff of assistants will be able to cover a variety of 
tasks that would otherwise be assigned to someone further up the ladder. Hence, by 
employing more assistants, the high officials can reduce their own work load. Second, having 
a large staff of assisting personnel increases the number of subordinates, which could give the 
higher officials a sense of increased power. 
                                                 
39 Early contributions discussing the role of bureaucrats are Tullock (1965), Downs (1957), Niskanen (1971) and Romer and 
Rosenthal (1979). Later contributions include Moene (1986), who shows that deviations from the socially optimally bureau 
are likely. More recent authors argue that bureaucrats are driven by career concerns; see, e.g., Dewatripont et al. (1999) and 
Alesina and Tabellini (2007). That bureaucrats matter for the political decision-making process as well as in the 
implementation phase has also been long recognized in the political science literature; see, e.g., Peters (1995), Wilson (1989) 
and Lipsky (1980).    31
 
On the other hand, we also saw that other sectors benefit from a grant increase through larger 
budgets and higher wages. It is therefore quite possible that the explanation behind the 
asymmetric effects on employment is less “cynical”. Even though we control for the direct 
effects of out-migration on personnel, the fact remains that our estimated effects represent 
local average treatment effects for those municipalities with diminishing population. Perhaps 
it is too risky for such municipalities to use increased grants to employ more personnel in for 
example child care and schools. Labor demand in these sectors is likely to be more sensitive 
to demographic changes than in the administrative sector, with the implication that risk-averse 
decision-makers (be they politicians, bureaucrats, or both) are reluctant to hire any personnel 
at all in the sectors where the demand is more volatile and uncertain. Given the widespread 
union power in Swedish municipalities and difficulties in firing personnel, this explanation 
may well be likely. Such heterogeneous treatment effects would mean that the overall average 
effect of grant increases on personnel could potentially be bigger than the local average effect 
identified here, which is good news for future policies aiming at increasing local public 
employment by means of grant increases.  
 
A third, and more optimistic, possible explanation for the results is that employing more 
administrative personnel could actually improve efficiency. Such improvement would be 
possible if other personnel, in the absence of a grant increase, are preoccupied with 
administrative duties for which they are overqualified due to lack of enough resources to hire 
administrative assistant personnel. Finally, it could be that increased grants are systematically 
associated with the need for an enlarged administration to handle the distribution of these 
grants. However, we believe this idea to be quite unlikely, given that the grants arrive with no 
strings attached and that there is no application procedure in place. 
 
The answer to the question posed in the title of this paper is hence negative: giving general 
grants to lower-level governments does not seem to be an effective way of stimulating local 
public employment. It is, of course, important to consider how much these results can be 
generalized. Specifically, there are two things that we would like to stress about the setting in 
this paper. First, the years studied here constitute a quite prosperous time period, and it is 
possible that the effects would be different in times of economic recessions, such as the 
current one. Second, in Sweden intergovernmental grants are distributed to municipalities 
with no strings attached, meaning that they can spend the money on whatever they wish. 
Thus, public funds targeted at stimulating employment might have different effects. 
   32
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Appendix – Additional Summary Statistics 
Table A1 contains a data description of wages to municipal employees, defined as the total 
monthly sum paid out per full-time equivalent, and of municipal expenditures, measured in 
SEK per capita. 
 
Table A1 Summary statistics. 
Variable Mean  Std  dev  Min  Max 
Wages,  total  personnel  17,352 1,770.9  14,027 22,785 
Wages,  administrative  personnel  20,039 2,353  15,094 28,657 
Wages, child care personnel  15,995  1,708  12,458  20,514 
Wages,  school  personnel  20,055 1,937  16,075 25,092 
Wages, elderly care personnel  15,608  1,545  12,621  20,965 
Wages, social welfare personnel  19,186  2,268.4  14,081  26,452 
Wages, technical personnel  15,982  1,557.8  12,945  21,778 
Expenditures,  total  38,049 7,321  20,606 68,380 
Expenditures,  child  care  4,462 871.8 2,277 8,474 
Expenditures, schools  11,958  2,165  5,292  21,070 
Expenditures, elderly care  12,056  3,466  2,926  24,831 
Expenditures, social welfare  1,941  699.8  128  4,973 
Expenditures, recreational  1,021  336.0  84  3,145 
Expenditures, culture  814.9  243.6  326  2,721 
Expenditures, political  621.9  269.6  85  2,641 
Expenditures, infrastructure  2,947  1,179  732  18,897 
  
Notes: The number of observations is 2,511 on wages and 2,502 on expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 